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GIVING OR LEAVING-WHAT IS A WILL? 
Olin L. Browder* 
The question raised by the title of this essay should be essentially 
as simple as that: Do you wan~ to give property, so that, having given 
it, it is no longer yours, or do you want to leave it behind at your 
death, directing who will receive it at that time? The statement of 
that issue suggests obvious differences in the consequences of inter 
vivas and testamentary dispositions. Most people also understand 
that a testamentary disposition invokes the elaborate machinery in-
volved in the administration of a testator's estate, which confers 
special rights in the creditors and the spouse of the decedent. 
In most cases the resolution of the issue is simple and obvious. 
Most deeds or gifts take effect without question, and large numbers 
of wills are perfunctorily probated. Trouble comes not because an 
instrument is not properly labelled or because most transactions are 
not clearly wills, deeds, or contracts. Nor is it often a problem that 
an instrument that appears to be a will really indicates an intention 
to make a gift inter vivas. The trouble comes with insistent efforts 
to use inter vivas transactions to produce results that may seem to 
be the purposes of a will. These have come to be called "will sub-
stitutes." Fortunately most of these recur in one of a number of 
easily identifiable forms. Others appear as a miscellany of devices 
that vary in certain particulars and are not wholly predictable. The 
reasons for the use of will substitutes constitute a fascinating story 
itself, which, however, is beyond the purposes of this essay. To most 
persons, some of the reasons seem obvious. In any event, the result 
has cast the original issue into a special form: When should a trans-
action that purports to be an inter vivas disposition of property be 
treated as really a will; that is, as justifying the epithet that it is "testa-
mentary"? For more than a century this issue has created a great 
fault line across the body of the American law of conveyancing, with 
continual disturbances along the line, which have produced cries 
from outraged commentators, not to speak of the unpublished cries 
of disappointed donees. 
The trouble has been evident from the beginning, but has 
swelled as court after court, in one kind of case or another, has been 
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moved to strike down as testamentary, transactions that could only 
have taken effect if they were inter vivos. In other words, a trans-
action executed as an inter vivos transfer will fail altogether if it is 
held to be really a will, for want of attestation, if not for the failure 
to meet some other formal requirement for the execution of wills. 
The question remains: Why does a court hold that a transaction that 
purports to be inter vivos is really a will? Will courts actually deem 
testamentary a transaction that would otherwise be valid under the 
law applicable to inter vivos transactions solely because the court 
senses that the donor resorted to the transaction to avoid leaving the 
property by will? There are a few cases that have expressly so held, 
but there are many more in which one senses such an idea as a mov-
ing force behind ostensible misapplications of the rules relating to 
inter vivos transactions. 
One can only speculate upon the reasons for an overly zealous or 
jealous defense by some courts of the policy of the statutes of wills. 
Is it really a genuine fear of letting loose a variety of informal dis-
positions in disregard for those safeguards prescribed by the statutes 
against imposition upon donors? Or have courts really been afraid 
that devices to avoid probate would let too much business slip out 
of the hands of the profession? In any case, a number of the old 
rigors invoked by some courts in defense of the statutes of wills have 
been designated as erroneous by other courts. Other old errors have 
been remedied by legislation. It is arguable that the forces driving 
people to avoid probate and the resistance of courts to those efforts 
have not yet been brought into a proper equilibrium. No overall 
rationale for drawing the inter vivos-testamentary distinction has 
been generally accepted. I am moved to tell the old story about 
the conflict primarily because of the continued progression of re-
ported cases in which inter vivos transactions have been attacked as 
testamentary, in many of which the attacks have failed. It almost 
seems that such attacks are always worth a try, and that there is too 
much of this sort of litigation. This will continue to be the case until 
some generally applicable rationale can gain general acceptance for 
applying the distinction properly. 
The idea that expresses the essence of a will is very elusive, if 
in fact there is any single notion about it. This becomes apparent 
when one surveys the kinds of cases in which transactions have been 
held testamentary. It is also discovered whenever one, in criticism 
of many of such cases, seeks to identify a proper basis for distinction. 
Inquiries of both sorts will be briefly undertaken here. 
Most of the cases in which the problem arises are those in which 
April-May 1977] Giving or Leaving 847 
a donor sought to do one of two things: either he expressed an in-
tention, often ambiguously, that his donee should not have complete, 
perfected, or vested ownership, or the right of enjoyment, until the 
donor's death; or, having given an otherwise valid vested remainder 
or other recognized future interest, he retained many if not most of 
the incidents of ownership. In respect to the first situation, nothing 
but chaos will result from a failure to see that it is quite possible 
and proper to convey interests inter vivas that are in some sense not 
perfected until the death of the donor. Some sophistication in 
handling the intricacies and refinements of inter vivos conveyancing 
and the doctrine of estates is indispensable. In the second situation, 
the donor's retention of substantial interests may be viewed as irrel-
evant to the characterization of a transaction as inter vivas, for reasons 
that will be presented later in this essay. 
In the course of this survey it is important, I believe, to draw 
the distinction between testamentary and inter vivas transactions with 
an eye to the ultimate purposes of those who seek to characterize 
transactions as testamentary. Most attention here is given to cases 
in which the challenge, if successful, leaves the transaction without 
any legal effect, in vindication of the policy of the statutes of wills. 
I will urge, however, that a disposition that survives such an attack 
still might properly be subject to attack by the creditors of a donor 
or by a surviving spouse. In other words, there should be room to 
claim that a disposition is testamentary for some but not all purposes. 
The failure to perceive this distinction has contributed to the failure 
to reach a successful resolution of the basic problem. 
I. THE NATURE AND SoURCE OF THE PROBLEM 
How do we respond to the efforts by courts to thread their way 
through a great variety of devices that raise doubt about their proper 
classification? Is there some simple standard that can be applied 
to all or most of these devices, and, if not, is there some fundamen-
tal rationale against which varying circumstances or ingredients can 
be tested? In approaching this problem on principle, I will first and 
for the most part be concerned with whether a transaction can be 
sustained as inter vivas for any purpose-that is, whether it fails alto-
gether for want of proper execution as a will. 
The ultimate source of most of the trouble is the fact that more 
formal requirements apply to wills than to inter vivas transactions. 
Deeds of land and gifts of personal property must be delivered. 
Some contracts require a writing, and others require no formalities. 
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But wills must be in writing, signed, and attested in a prescribed 
manner. Much grief might be avoided if uniform requirements 
were imposed. It would require no great wrench, for example, if 
deeds had to be attested, for in some states there is such a require-
ment at least as a condition of recording.1 Such a requirement, how-
ever, can hardly be proposed for gifts of personal property, bank ac-
counts, or other contracts. A case could indeed be made for going 
the other way and eliminating attestation and the other special for-
malities for executing wills. If such a position were adopted, most 
of what follows here would become irrelevant, and most of the liti-
gation over the inter vivos-testamentary distinction would disappear. 
I do not think, however, that there is a fair prospect for such a change 
in the law in the foreseeable future. Some comment may be in 
order on why that is, and perhaps should be, so. 
Analyses have been offered of the policy behind the statutes of 
wills, the several functions that the traditional formal requirements 
are believed to serve, and whether those requirements are too exact-
ing or not exacting enough. 2 Commentators have said that the re-
quirements serve evidentiary, cautionary, protective, and channeling 
functions. There is a recent proposal to retreat from a literal and 
exact compliance with the detailed formalities in favor of a doctrine 
of "substantial compliance,"3 but this is not a proposal to eliminate 
these requirements or even those that are more exacting than the 
Statute of Frauds. All the identified purposes of the formal require-
ments assume that special dangers exist in the execution of wills. 
The dangers of fraud, forgery, undue influence, donative incapacity, 
and loose and irresolute expressions of donative intent are present 
in all donative transactions. Experience also shows that the more 
rigorous requirements for wills are not guarantees against such 
dangers.' Are these dangers, however, more to be feared when wills 
are made? We may indeed feel the need for more assurance of 
genuineness when some person, who may be anyone, comes for-
ward with. an instrument that was found among a decedent's 
possessions. Such assurance is sought not only in the special re-
quirements for executing wills but also in the requirements for 
proving wills when they are offered to begin the process of estate 
administration. Implicit in all this is the assumption that generally 
1. See 3 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 12.59 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [herein-
after cited as ALP]. 
2. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
489 (1975); Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 
1 (1941). 
3. See Langbein, supra note 2, 
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there are more risks of imposition in the circumstances in which wills 
are made than in those surrounding inter vivos transfers, although 
the point is arguable because of the wide range of circumstances that 
may attend either type of transaction. In fact, there may be greater 
danger in some inter vivos transactions than in the making of most 
wills. The prescribed formalities for wills, however, are framed to 
deal with the probability of risks in the generality of wills, in most 
of which there is no doubt about their essence as testamentary 
dispositions. 
It should not be assumed, moreover, that differences in formal 
requirements are the only reason why we must decide whether a dis-
position of property is testamentary or inter vivos. A will must be 
probated and the estate of the testator administered. Policy matters 
are involved in this machinery, particularly in the claims of creditors 
or a surviving spouse. A convenient process is desirable even if only 
to establish that there are no such claims. There may be no public 
policy involved in the rules relating to the abatement or ademption 
of legacies and devises, but the obvious usefulness of such rules pre-
supposes the existence of decedents' estates to which they are appli-
cable. We surely are not yet ready to dispense with estate adminis-
tration and attach the same consequences to a disposition by will as 
to a conveyance inter vivos, leaving as the sole difference the fact 
that a disposition by will takes effect at the testator's death. So even 
if a dispositive instrument is duly attested and valid either as a deed 
or a will, it must still be decided whether the property involved is 
or is not to be administered as part of the donor's estate. It still 
must be decided whether the instrument is a deed or a will. 
We must come finally to deal with that question. Wills have 
much in common with other donative transactions. Classification 
is not aided by looking behind the transaction itself to discover the 
donor's ultimate objectives. It can readily be assumed that in many 
cases a testator wishes to be assured that certain persons will be ade-
quately provided for after his death. Every property owner thinks 
about the disposition of his property after his death, and directs what 
is to be done, unless he is content with the law of intestate succes-
sion or does not really care. He can attain most of the same objec-
tives, however, by a variety of inter vivos transactions. The search 
for a testamentary intent can lead to nothing more than the intent 
to do those things, and in those ways, which, if prescribed by him, 
identify his efforts as a will. So what is a will? 
It is natural to put the question in a manner that identifies the 
way in which a will differs from all_ inter vivos dispositions, for the 
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way in which inter vivos transactions differ from one another is rele-
vant here only to that question. It is commonly said that a will is 
"ambulatory." That is not a very helpful term, and courts do not 
agree upon its meaning. In a brief essay written many years ago, 
Percy Bordwell applied his acute perception to the essence of a will, 4 
though, unfortunately, he did not extend his analysis beyond a few 
illustrative examples. He identified two essential ingredients: first, 
a will is not effective until death, and, second, it is revocable. These 
two elements seem either to be two ways of saying the same thing 
or to be inconsistent. How can you revoke a transfer of property 
before it has taken effect? Of course it can be done with a will, but 
this is an idea that sometimes bothers students in their study of wills. 
Again there is no need to digress here to explain the problem except 
to suggest that it is a sign of the subtleties involved in understanding 
the essence of wills. Professor Bordwell said that the first of these 
ingredients relates to the property involved and the second relates 
to the person who makes and revokes a will. Although essential 
to the definition of a will, revocability may be dismissed as a featui:e 
that distinguishes a will from an inter vivos transaction, so long as 
we recognize revocable inter vivos trusts or gifts causa mortis, as well 
as some authority that permits ordinary deeds to be revocable. We 
should not, however, too quickly assume that the inherent revocabil-
ity of a will is the same as the expressly reserved revocability of a 
deed or trust instrument. It has been pointed out in a discussion 
of the revocability of simple deeds5 that a will can be revoked merely 
by destroying it. Where a power of revocation is reserved in an inter 
vivos instrument, the power must be exercised as prescribed in the 
instrument or by law-that is, by executing another instrument or 
by giving proper notice. 
Does the other ingredient-the ineffectiveness of the transfer 
until death of the testator-fare any better? The distinction is ob-
vious: an inter vivos transfer of property is effective upon execu-
tion or delivery; a will transfers property only upon the testator's 
death. It may seem that this simple distinction is all we need to 
know, but unfortunately the subtleties resorted to in some will substi-
tutes are designed to cast, or have the effect of casting, a cloud over 
that issue. The main problem comes in deciding what we mean by a 
will's taking effect; and the main source of the problem lies in the 
subtleties of the doctrine of estates, which permit the creation or re-
4. Bordwell, Testamentary Dispositions, 19 KY. L.J. 283 (1931). 
5. See Garvey, Revocable Gifts of Legal Interests in Land, 54 KY. L.J. 19 (1965), 
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tention of a variety of present and future interests, either vested, con-
tingent, or defeasible, and which may make the vesting or time of 
enjoyment depend upon the death of the donor. In an attempted 
inter vivos transaction of such complexity, what is it that must take 
effect upon execution or delivery? An interest need not vest or be-
come possessory at that time. For example, a conveyance to A for 
life, remainder to B takes effect upon delivery, for B has been given 
a remainder. So also if B is given the property only if he survives 
A or the grantor, since the deed gives him a contingent remainder. 
By the same token, if a settlor creates a revocable trust, the 
conveyance is effective though the settlor, by revoking, can undo 
it altogether. This is also true if the settlor additionally retains 
a life interest, or even retains a general power of appointment. It 
is clear that a settlor can, by an inter vivos conveyance, retain until 
his death all but a small immeasurable part of the economic value 
of the property conveyed. This leaves us with the proposition that 
a conveyance is effective inter vivos and is not testamentary if only 
the merest fragment of a property interest passes to someone else. 
This is the position upon which a number of courts appear to have 
come to rest. 
If a donor can, by ingeniously framed inter vivos transactions, 
do almost all that he can do by will, what reason is there for impos-
ing stricter formal requirements for wills than for inter vivos trans-
actions? The main reason is the practical fact that most people who 
want to make wills do make them, for most people who resort to 
will substitutes have reasons other than the avoidance of the formal 
requirements for executing wills. If the belief that wills present 
special dangers is justified, there is little reason to remove the special 
wills requirements for that large majority of persons who find no 
reason to resort to will substitutes. For those who do wish to use 
will substitutes, the circumstances in which they do so may still be 
found not to subvert the policy behind the formal will requirements. 
It seems reasonable to argue that such an inter vivos transfer does 
not subvert the policies of the statutes of wills if at least one of two 
facts is established: (1) either the transaction creates no greater risk 
to its integrity than that which attends any typical inter vivos trans-
action; or (2) if such a risk is created, the transaction is attended 
by circumstances that provide a comparable substitute for the formal 
requirements for wills. For example, if property is conveyed in 
trust, the presence of a trustee who has legal title, possession of a 
trust instrument and the trust estate, and rights and duties under the 
trust, may constitute a sufficient safeguard for the integrity of the 
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transaction, no matter how many strings upon the transfer the settlor 
may reserve in the trust instrument. It has been argued that a 
trustee can be relied on for this purpose only if he really is a disin-
terested party, such as a professional trustee, with no incentive to 
fabricate the existence or terms of the trust. 6 The trouble with this 
argument is that it applies as well to any conveyance in trust, even 
those that no one has ever alleged to be testamentary. This is not 
to speak of the difficulty of deciding on an ad hoc basis what degree 
or .kind of interest is disqualifying. It must be remembered that we 
are striving for a reasonably workable way through a maze of 
variabilities, and predictability and administrative simplicity must 
therefore be taken into account. No perfectly workable guarantees 
are available. 
This approach might be taken one step further. It could be 
argued that, so long as the existence of one of the two facts identi-
fied above is established, any otherwise effective attempt to transfer 
property should be sustained as an inter vivos transfer, regardless 
of whether some sort of property interest passed prior to the donor's 
death. Such an extension, however, bears little prospect of accept-
ance. Not only the validity but the consequences of dispositive 
transactions would be rendered unnecessarily unpredictable. In re-
spect to the consequences, when would an instrument be probated 
as a will and when would it be held to have passed property without 
administration? Assuming that the estate of a decedent was other-
wise solvent, and that his spouse raised no objection to the convey-
ance, would this issue tum on whether the donor merely indicated 
that he wished the property to be administered at his death, by desig-
nating the instrument as a will or otherwise? Or would it be left 
to the donees to decide? 
This problem might be partially solved by separating the question 
of the validity of the transaction from the other consequences of de-
ciding whether a conveyance is testamentary or inter vivos. This 
would mean that a disposition could be upheld if it satisfied the re-
quirements for inter vivos transfers-that is, by a writing duly 
delivered-provided -that one of the two elements stated above was 
also present. That would leave the passing-of-an-interest test to 
operate for the purpose of deciding whether the property involved 
was to be administered as part of the donor's estate. In other words, 
if the test were not passed, the disposition would be treated as a valid 
6. See Comment, Trusts Which Substitute for Wills: A Problem of Faulty Analy-
sis, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 113 (1956). 
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will. The test of validity, however, would still remain essentially un-
defined. For courts imbued with respect for the precise require-
ments of the statutes of wills, such a solution hardly seems promising 
without legislation. 
All this brings me to a tentative hypothesis concerning a proper 
standard for drawing the distinction between inter vivos and testa-
mentary transactions. If the hypothesis is vindicated by an examina-
tion of the problems that have appeared in the cases, it would in 
its consequences not be far from the standard discussed in the pre-
ceding paragraph. It would, however, leave the courts to operate 
much as they have tried to do in the past, but, I hope, with better 
effect. I propose that the passing-of-an-interest test be tentatively 
accepted, subject to an assumption not yet proven-that in all or 
most of the types of cases that pass the test, adequate safeguards 
exist against the dangers that the statutes of wills were designed to 
prevent. If that assumption proves correct, the passing-of-an-
interest test would become the basic standard. It should, however, 
be subjected to a further qualification. A court should leave open 
the door to litigants to prove in a particular case, perhaps not now 
foreseen, that adequate safeguards were not present. Such a 
scheme really comes down to proceeding in much the same fashion 
as many courts have tried to proceed, but with a somewhat more en-
lightened application of the test. In retaining such a formal technical 
standard at least as a starting point, substance is not really sub-
ordinated to form. The standard rather would serve as a reasonably 
simple device for saving transactions that ought to be saved. 
To say that a transfer of property is inter vivos if some recog-
nized interest passes when the instrument is properly executed does 
not mean, of course, that if such an interest passes, all transfers of 
other property or of the same property to other persons contained 
in the same instrument are thereby saved as inter vivos. Each trans-
fer of any interest, present or future, to any person, must pass the 
same test. 
Acceptance of the passing-of-an-interest standard places a court 
in the position that reverses the approach to the problem initially sug-
gested above. Instead of beginning by asking what is a will, a court 
will inquire first whether a deed, a trust agreement, a gift, or a con-
tract satisfies the law governing such transactions. This of course 
is what courts have always purported to do. Very often the term 
"testamentary" is merely an epithet applied to a transaction that fails 
to take effect as intended. Such an approach, however, has not pre-
vented courts from following the circuitous analysis that a transaction 
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is not effective inter vivos because, for some vague reason, it is 
testamentary. 
It should now be emphasized again that the standard proposed 
herein rests on the important assumption that most if not al.I of the 
usual will substitutes that meet the passing-of-an-interest test also pro-
vide adequate safeguards of the policy of the statutes of wills. It is now 
time to examine the recurrent types of transactions, and some mis-
cellaneous variants, that have been held testamentary, as well as a 
few that have survived such a challenge, and to comment on the pro-
priety of applying our qualified test in such cases. 
II. THE INTER VIVOS-TESTAMENTARY 
DISTINCTION IN THE COURTS 
A. The Validity of Inter Vivos Transactions 
1. Contracts 
I will begin this section by treating contractual transactions as a 
special category, since they can be disposed of more simply and sum-
marily. It will no doubt shock some people that any contract could 
ever have been successfully attacked as a testamentary transfer of 
property. A promise to pay money or to give other valuable things 
can be said to create at least a chose in action in the promisee, which 
for many purposes is a property interest. That is no reason to treat 
the making of such a promise as a transfer of property that is subject 
to the formal rules of conveyancing. The denial of a contractual 
right to a promisee, often a third-party beneficiary, on the ground 
that the promise is testamentary, is the most flagrant example of the 
obsession of courts with sniffing out efforts by donors to confer by 
other means what the courts perceive to be the benefits of a will. 
In a sense, a life insurance contract is one of the most "testamentary" 
of all will substitutes. With the optional settlements that are often 
available, it can perform all the functions of a will and still free the 
proceeds from an estate administration. It may be asked why it has 
escaped unscathed when similar contracts have been challenged. In 
any case, I do not believe that contractual transactions need to meet 
any passing-of-an-interest test, since the crucial question in such 
transactions concerns the validity and enforceability of a promise, 
and not whether the effect of the promise is to create a property 
interest. The only legitimate concern about the substitution of con-
tracts for wills might be whether the transaction produces the same 
dangers as an oral will. 
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a. Bank accounts. The dismal story of the courts' treatment of 
joint and other types of bank accounts is the most offensive and 
damaging example of the misuse of the statutes of wills. This treat-
ment has received ample commentary and been sorely criticized7 and 
will therefore be dismissed summarily here. The so-called pay-on-
death (POD) account has been universally condemned by the courts 
as a means of creating rights in anyone other than the depositor. 8 
Such an account bears both the name of the depositor and that of 
another person to whom the balance of the account is made payable 
on the death of the depositor. Such an arrangement is presumably 
different from a life insurance contract because the depositor re-
mains as free to withdraw funds as if the account were in his sole 
name. But this should be of no concern if the bank's obligation to 
pay is enforceable under contract law. Moreover, even if the policy 
governing wills were applicable to contracts, no more of the risks af-
fecting the execution of wills appear here than in any bank account. 
A few statutes authorize POD accounts.9 
The greatest confusion in analysis is found in the treatment of 
the joint bank account in which a person deposits all the money in 
favor of himself and another, with the right of survivorship. Some 
courts speak of these as true joint tenancies, which they are not. 
Most courts have used either the "gift theory" or the "contract 
theory," with the former predominating, although, oddly, the choice 
of theory leads to little difference in result. There is no testamen-
tary problem if it is intended that both depositors are to have the 
same right to draw upon the account. But if extrinsic proof estab-
lishes that the person whose money is deposited intends to reserve 
the sole right to withdraw it during the depositors' joint lives and 
to give the codepositor only the right of survivorship, then ~e trans-
action is testamentary and the codepositor has no rights.10 Such 
a result is subject to the same objections as those made in respect 
7. See BROWN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY § 8.8 (3d ed. W. Raushenbush 1975) 
[hereinafter cited as BROWN]; Kepner, Five More Years of the Joint Bank Account 
Muddle, 26 U. Cm. L. REV. 376 (1959); Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank 
Account-A Concept Without a Name, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 596 (1953); Wellman, 
The Joint and Survivor Account in Michigan-Progress Through Confusion, 63 
MICH. L. REV. 629 (1965). 
8. See, e.g., Northwestern Natl. Bank v. Daniel, 80 S.D. 528, 127 N.W.2d 714 
(1964). 
9. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9-A-218 (West Supp. 1975). 
10. BROWN, supra note 7, at 184 n.12; cf. Farmers Bank v. Howard, 276 A.2d 744 
(Del. Ch. 19-71). But see Blanchette v. Blanchette, 3'62 Mass. 518, 287 N.E.2d 
459 (1972). 
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to the courts' treatment of POD accounts. The result has been 
changed in the Uniform Probate Code.11 
A New Jersey court denied the claims of the beneficiary of a 
decedent's account in a credit union12 on the ground that the trans-
action was testamentary. A statute authorizing payment as directed 
in such an account was treated like a "bank-protection" statute, and 
therefore held not to govern the claims of competing claimants. 
Another statute that authorized POD bank accounts was also held 
not applicable. The court said that the account was not a life insur-
ance contract because it was a debt due the decedent on demand, 
and concluded with the remarkable statement that there was no bind-
ing promise by the credit union. And so the preposterous old saws 
about bank accounts not only die hard, but are actually extended. 
b. Totten trusts. This is a form of bank account recognized 
in some states where A deposits money in his own name "in trust 
for B." It is construed to be a kind of self-declared trust, in which 
a power to revoke is implied in A's favor and can be exercised 
merely by withdrawals from the account, leaving B to claim as bene-
ficiary any balance left at A's death. In substance, the Totten trust 
is no more than a disguised POD account and should be sustained 
on a contract basis. But to call it that would condemn it in the eyes 
of most courts. For this reason, a property-trust analysis is typically 
made to sustain it on the theory that a tenuous interest has passed 
to the beneficiary, subject to revocation and perhaps also conditioned 
on the requirement that the beneficiary survive the depositor-settler. 
Such an analysis provides the most strained construction to be found 
in favor of saving a transaction as inter vivos. Unlike most trusts, 
the power to revoke is implied, and the power is exercisable merely by 
withdrawals from the account by the settler. Moreover, it is also 
implied that the beneficiary has no benefits from the so-called trust 
during the settler's lifetime. All of these features of the Totten trust 
present the conceptual difficulty that the settler remains as free to deal 
with the account as he would be if it were in his sole name. Never-
theless, the device is really innocuous, for the formalities involved in 
creating and using such an account seem peculiarly free of any 
danger of fabrication. Its acceptance in a number of jurisdictions18 
is a striking exception to the attitudes of most courts toward will 
substitutes. 
H. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE§§ 6-103, 6-104. 
12. In re Estate of Posey, 89 N.J. Super. 293, 214 A.2d 7'13 (Union County 
Ct., P. Div. 1965). 
13. 1 ScO'IT ON TRusTs § 58.5 (3d ed. Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Scorr]. 
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c. Other contracts. A variety of other contractual provisions, 
which are usually only incidental or subordinate to other terms of 
valid contracts, have met the same fate as the POD and joint bank 
accounts. A contract, for example, may provide that upon the death 
of the principal obligee a payment is to be made to his widow or 
others; it may sometimes add the requirement that the alternate pay-
ees be then living. Or the contract may provide that an obligation 
to pay in installments is discharged if the promiser survives the 
promisee. There is no good reason to hold either type of provision 
testamentary and void, 14 although occasionally they have been so 
held. 15 In contrast, a provision in a contract of employment stipulat-
ing that commissions earned by the employee would be paid to him 
if he were living, or, if not, to his wife, if she were living, or, if not, 
then to a daughter, was held invalid to create any interests in the 
wife or daughter.16 The court simply stated that the contract provi-
sion was clearly testamentary. It has been held that a provision in 
a written contract of employment stipulating that upon the death of 
the promisor-employer the person employed would be entitled to the 
promiser's business is valid and binding.17 The result should be the 
same whether the transaction is analyzed in purely contractual terms 
or as a present conveyance of a future interest in the business.18 
Suppose two persons mutually agree that the one who survives 
shall have the property of the decedent. In Spinks v. Rice,19 such 
a written agreement, signed by both parties and notarized, provided 
that "all property he may have is to be her sole and separate prop-
erty," should she survive him. The instrument was ambiguous about 
the extent of the promise of the other party. The decedent had 
made a prior will disposing of all of her property. Assuming that 
the two promises were identical, mutual promises, the court held that 
the instrument was "fundamentally testamentary," and so in sub-
stance a joint and mutual will that failed for want of attestation. 
It seems clear from the language of the instrument that it would 
be difficult to sustain the transaction as an inter vivos conveyance, 
since it purported to deal only with property that a contracting party 
owned at death. It would require even greater conceptual straining 
14. Valenzuela v. Anchonda, 22 Ariz. App. 332, 527 P.2d 109 (1974). 
15. See ATKINSON ON WILLS 195 (2d ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as ATKINSON]. 
16. -See Combined Ins. Co. of America v. Salisbury, 101 R.I. 448, 224 A.2d 383 
(1966). 
17. See Hunt v. Dallmeyer, 5'17 S.W.2d 720 (Mo. App. 1974). 
18. But see Hruby v. Romanick, 128 N.W.2d 106 (N.D. 1964). 
19. 187 Va. 730, 47 S.E.2d 424 (1948). 
858 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:845 
here than was resorted to in a similar case20 to declare the instru-
ment an effective conveyance of all the grantee's property subject 
to a reserved life estate and a power of appointment in the grantor. 
But to call it a joint and mutual will does not reach the substance 
of the parties' declared intention, even if it had been properly exe-
cuted as a will. The parties purported to make an agreement, and 
by construction each purported to bind himself as to the disposition 
of his property. A joint and mutual will may be found to imply a 
contract not to revoke it, but usually such a contract is not found to 
be binding during the joint lives of the parties. If these parties in-
tended to leave themselves free to dispose of their respective prop-
erty during their joint lives, in what way did they intend to be bound? 
Cannot a person explicitly agree that he shall be free to dispose of 
his property inter vivos, but be bound to do everything necessary to 
assure that whatever remains at his death shall go to the other party 
and to no one else? So conceived, the arrangement was an exchange 
of promises to make a will, which implicitly means to die leaving 
such a will and to revoke any prior inconsistent will. 
Contracts to make wills, even when not limited to such contracts 
as are implied in joint and mutual wills, are not new. The circum-
stances under which such contracts are valid, the proper interpreta-
tion of their meaning and dimensions, and the proper remedies for 
their enforcement, are questions that cannot be explored here. 21 
There may be no exact precedents for the Spinks case, but the only 
problem is to see whether one such promise is sufficient considera-
tion for the other or whether they are both illusory. I think it is 
at least arguable that they are not illusory. Each promise is subject 
to two qualifications: it applies only to property owned at death and 
only if the other party is then living. The latter provision is beyond 
the control of the promisor; the former deprives him of his freedom 
to give his property by will to whomever he pleases. Such a contract 
of course could not itself dispose of property, even as a will, or serve 
to revoke any prior will. But if breached, the remedies would be 
those normally available for breach of contract, or at least those for 
contracts to make wills. 
If the agreement in Spinks is properly construed as intended to 
have such effect, and if such promises are binding under contract 
law, it still remains to be seen whether the policy of the wills acts 
20. Ricker v. Brown, 183 Mass. 424, 67 N.E. 353 (1903). 
21. For a discussion of these issues, see B. SPARKS, CONTRACTS To MAKE WILLS 
(1956). 
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is thereby subverted. The promises in Spinks embraced real estate, 
and so were subject to the Statute of Frauds, if indeed they would 
not have been so subject had they embraced only personal property. 
Surely an oral agreement of this sort would present all the risks and 
dangers of oral wills. Is an instrument in writing sufficient? Most of 
the problems discussed above about contracts that have not been, or 
should not have been, vitiated as testamentary transfers of property 
are third-party beneficiary contracts, in which the testimony of the 
promisor, as a "third-party" interposed between a donor and his 
beneficiary, may provide an adequate safeguard to the integrity of 
the transaction. That element is lacking in the Spinks case. But 
the special risks that the wills acts are designed to meet also were 
not present, at least to no greater degree than in any contract to make 
a will. No such risks are created merely by the fact that the property 
bound by the contract cannot be identified until the death of the 
promisee, for the fact of dispositions by the promisor in his lifetime 
is a fact not readily fabricated by false testimony. 
In McCarthy v. Pieret,22 an agreement to extend a bond and 
mortgage provided that if the mortgagee died before the new due 
date, interest and principal were to be paid to designated persons. 
The court held that those persons had no rights under the agreement 
because it was testamentary. The court explained that no valid gift 
was perfected, an irrelevant statement because no transfer of prop-
erty was attempted. In recognizing that valid third-party beneficiary 
contracts can be made, the court dismissed this one by remarking 
that in enforceable third-party beneficiary contracts the promisee is 
unable to control the promisor in the fulfillment of the promise. 
Presumably the court meant that here the beneficiaries had no 
presently enforceable rights and that the mortgagee could have re-
ceived payment of the mortgage debt and discharged the mortgage 
without accountability to anyone. This, however, involves no greater 
control than exists where an insured reserves the right to change the 
beneficiary of an insurance contract, not to speak of the power of 
a settlor to revoke a trust. The decision has been much criticized 
and is indefensible. 23 It may have prompted a statutory change in 
the New York law,24 which, however, failed to reach the particular 
kind of transaction involved in this case. 
Much unnecessary fall-out from some courts' attacks upon con-
22. 281 N.Y. 407, 24 N.E.2d 102 (1939). 
23. See 1 Scarr, supra note 13, § 56.5A. 
24. N.Y. EsT., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW§ 13-3.2 (McKinney 1967). 
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tractual provisions as testamentary would be prevented by an unusual 
section of the Uniform Probate Code. 25 It is provided that in any 
written instrument effective as a contract, gift, conveyance, or trust, 
certain provisions shall not be deemed testamentary, nor render the 
instrument testamentary. Two such provisions are: (1) that money 
or other benefits theretofore due to, controlled, or owned by a dece-
dent shall be paid after his death to a person designated by the 
decedent in either the instrument or a separate writing, including a 
will, executed at the same time as the instrument or subsequently; 
and (2) that any money due or to become due under the instrument 
shall cease to be payable in event of the death of the promisee or 
the promiser before payment or demand. 
2. Deeds 
a. Provisions concerning the passing of title. Deeds sometimes 
provide that they are not to take effect until the death of the grantor, 
or that no title is to pass or vest until his death. It is sometimes 
held that such deeds are not effective inter vivos. 26 Enlightened 
construction, however, permits the conclusion that the grantor in-
tends merely to postpone enjoyment and so to convey a future 
interest, retaining a life estate. 27 Under this construction, the result 
is the same as the case in which a granter, by will or deed, conveys 
to A for life, and says that upon A's death "I give to B," or that 
the property shall then vest in B. B takes a vested remainder.28 
Even if such a provision is construed as directing that no interest 
shall pass until the grantor's death, the conveyance must be regarded 
as effective at once. If the granter has made it clear that full owner-
ship is to reach the grantee upon the grantor's death, there is nothing 
he can do thereafter to prevent it. Such a certainty of future full 
enjoyment cannot be treated as anything other than a property inter-
est, whatever the granter calls it, and despite any expression by him 
that nothing is to pass until a future event occurs. The problem is 
not essentially different if the deed provides that the grantee is to 
take upon the grantor's death only if he survives the granter. 20 The 
25. UNIFORM PROBATE CoDE § 6-201. 
26. See, e.g., Gardner v. Thames, 223 Ga. 378, 154 S.E.2d 926 (1967); Wheeler 
v. Rines, 375 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1964); Coulter v. Carter, 200 Miss, 135, 26 So, 2d 
344 (1946); ATKINSON, supra note 15, at 187. 
27. ATKINSON, supra note 15, at 187. 
28. See Dowd v. Scally, 174 N.W. 93-8 (Iowa 19'19), a/Id. on rehearing, 184 
N.W. 340 (Iowa 1921). 
29. See Abbott v. Holway, 72 Me. 298 (1881). 
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condition of survivorship is beyond the control of the grantor, and 
the grantee simply takes a contingent future interest. 
A duly executed and delivered deed that expressly or by proper 
construction reserves a life estate in the grantor poses no greater 
threat to the policy of the statutes of wills than a deed that conveys 
a fee simple outright. 
b. Delivery. By far the most common type of case in which 
a transaction is challenged or defeated as testamentary involves the 
delivery of deeds. The full dimensions of the subtle requirement 
of delivery cannot be explored here. At the very least, it can be 
said that delivery does not require the physical transfer of the instru-
ment, although such transfer is the best way to accomplish it. "De-
livery" essentially means an objective manifestation of the grantor's 
intention that the conveyancing transaction has been concluded. 
Delivery properly has nothing to do with the nature or extent of the 
property interest conveyed, although a significant exception to this 
proposition will be noted below. 
If a grantor fails to deliver his deed during his lifetime, the deed 
is ineffective, and it may be proper to describe the transaction as 
testamentary.30 A few variations of this problem can be considered 
here. Substantial, though not uncontroverted, authority allows a 
grantor to reserve the power to revoke his conveyance without ren-
dering the conveyance testamentary.31 The universal recognition of 
revocable trusts renders incongruous any other rule for conveyances 
not in trust. 
Grantors have delivered deeds in escrow with the direction that 
the deed be delivered to the grantee upon the grantor's death. In 
cases where the grantor has clearly reserved no right to recall the 
deed, it is generally held that the conveyance is effective upon deliv-
ery in escrow, but in effect subject to a life estate in the grantor.32 
Exception could have been taken to this device as an initial proposi-
tion on the ground that such a manipulation of the delivery process, 
as a substitute for an express reservation of a life estate in the deed, 
is not consistent with the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, or 
perhaps the parol evidence rule. Conceding the general acceptance 
of this device, one might further argue that the informal reservation 
by the grantor of the right to recall the deed is also sustainable, on 
the same basis, as a power to revoke. Respect for the nature and 
. 30. See Palmer v. Riggs, 197 Miss. 256, 19 So. 2d 807 (1944). 
31. See Garvey, supra note 5. 
32. 3 ALP, supra note 1, § 12.67. Contra, Costello v. Costello, 136 Conn. 611, 
73 A.2d 333 (1950). 
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importance of the formal requirement of delivery, however, may 
fully justify regarding such further qualification of it as essentially 
subversive. On the other hand, there is no reason why a direction 
by a grantor to deliver a deed held in escrow upon his death if the 
grantee is then living should not also be valid. Again, it should not 
matter that the deed conveyed a contingent rather than a vested re-
mainder. There is, however, considerable authority to the con-
trary. 33 The argument by some courts that in such a case the grantor 
has not parted with all control over the deed, because in one event 
he will be entitled to have it back, reveals a misconception concern-
ing the delivery requirement, since the event upon which the grantor 
can regain it is not subject to his control. 34 
There is an old rule of conveyancing that a deed cannot be de-
livered in escrow to the grantee.35 This means that an effort to 
make a conditional delivery by delivering to the grantee rather than 
to a third person in escrow results in an absolute conveyance free 
of any conditions. A number of courts have given this rule modern 
acceptance, and presumably it also applies if the delivery is not sub-
ject to a true condition but rather to a direction that the deed is to 
be recorded after the grantor's death or is otherwise to pass the right 
of enjoyment at that time. At least one court, however, has per-
mitted a grantor to prove that delivery to the grantee, his wife, was 
on condition that she not record the deed unless he were killed on 
a military mission. 36 A number of recent cases have taken a third 
position-that the conveyance is testamentary and void.37 It is at 
least arguable that proof of oral conditions should not be admissible 
for the purpose of giving effect to them, where no third person is 
involved who can testify to the transaction. It is also arguable that 
neither a grantor nor anyone claiming his property should be per-
mitted to offer proof of such a condition even for the purpose of 
demonstrating that the deed was not delivered at all. All proof of 
delivery is extrinsic, but where a deed is normally given to the grantee, 
a court may well resist proof denying delivery that consists solely of 
33. 3 ALP, supra note 1, § 12.67. 
34. See Ballentine, When Are Deeds Testamentary, 18 MICH. L. REv. 470, 478 
(1'920). 
35. 3 ALP, supra note 1, § 12.66 n.7. 
36. See Chillemi v. Chillemi, 197 Md. 257, 78 A.2d 750 (1951). 
37. E.g., Kelly v. Bank of America, 1-12 Cal. App. 2d 388, 242 P.2d 923 (1952); 
Peebles v. Rodgers, 211 Miss. 8, 50 So. 2d 632 (1951); First Sec. Bank v. Burgi, 
122 Utah 445, 251 P.2d 297 (1952); cf. Kniebbe v. Wade, 161 Ohio St. 294, 118 
N.E.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. 1954). 
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oral assertions of conditions by the grantor. It still can be argued 
that the old rule is the best. 
A strange twist to this problem appeared in Johnson v. Weldy,38 
a case in which a settlor conveyed land to her daughter by a deed 
absolute on its face. Through an accompanying trust instrument, the 
settlor directed her daughter, in the event of the settlor's death, to 
administer the property in trust for designated beneficiaries, and in 
the meantime to hold the deed in escrow and record it after the set-
tlor's death. The court held that the trust was testamentary and in-
valid, leaving the original deed absolute, and that a reconveyance 
by the grantee to the grantor revested absolute title in her. Instead 
of conveying in trust with the reservation of an equitable interest for 
life in the settlor, cannot a settlor convey in trust, reserving a full 
legal life estate? The court recognized that such a conclusion had 
been reached in a prior case containing ambiguous trust language. 
The court's effort to distinguish these cases was unconvincing. It 
was hardly sufficient to say that this "whole transaction looks to the 
future." The language about holding the deed in escrow, since it 
was expressed in the trust instrument itself, does not raise the prob-
lem about delivering a deed in escrow to the grantee. Perhaps the 
court was moved by the particular circumstances following the 
original transaction; but in the absence of proof that the settlor re-
served any power to recall the deed, should the settlor's initial pur-
pose, which seems obvious from the trust instrument, be subverted 
by the ineptitude of the draftsman? 
Noble v. Fickes39 is a famous case in which a warranty deed was 
defeated for want of delivery because the grantor, in delivering the 
deed in escrow, had reserved the right to recall it. The court said 
that the grantor's intent in such circumstances was essentially testa-
mentary. Since the deed was attested, the grantee then offered it for 
probate, which was denied because the grantor's testamentary intent 
did not appear from the language of the deed and could not be proved 
extrinsically. The result is logical if a court insists upon such a rule 
respecting proof of testamentary intent when an instrument is offered 
as a will. Proof of delivery of a deed is necessarily extrinsic, but proof 
of testamentary intent is not. It also is not necessary to label as testa-
mentary every deed that fails for want of delivery. On the other hand, 
where a deed fails because the grantor has reserved the right to re-
call it, it is not inaccurate to say that the keeping of such a string 
38. 79 N.D. 80, 54 N.W.2d 829< (1952). 
39. 230 Ill. 594, 82 N.E. 950 (1907). 
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on the transaction reveals a testamentary purpose. In any event, 
as argued by dissenting justices, there may be some need to bring 
the rules relating to these two types of transactions into better con-
formity, at least to the extent of avoiding the consequences of defeat-
ing a deed because it is testamentary and defeating it also as a will 
because it is not. 40 
When granters attempt to keep strings on their conveyances by 
manipulating the delivery requirement, serious risks such as those 
that properly offend the statutes of wills can arise, since the delivery 
of a deed is entirely dependent on extrinsic proof, and such proof 
can establish delivery even where the deed remains in the grantor's 
possession. It would appear, however, that by a proper definition 
and application of the delivery requirement, these risks can be re-
duced to manageable levels, especially where a deed is delivered in 
escrow, so that the testimony of the escrowee is available. In fact, 
the same delivery problems would exist even if it were required that 
deeds be attested. 
3. Gifts of Personal Property 
Some of the problems here are much the same as those 
encountered above involving deeds of land. Others arise out of 
transactions that are contractual but which contain provisions that 
cannot be enforced as contracts. As for formal requirements, gifts 
need not be in writing although they must meet the delivery require-
ment, which is analogous to but not the same as the requirement 
of the delivery of deeds. Delivery of gifts builds on the base of a 
physical transfer of a chattel.. The obvious need for qualifications 
and substitutes is accommodated by notions of "constructive" and 
"symbolical" delivery, as illustrated by a signed paper or instrument 
of gift. Such a delivery is accepted in many but not all circumstan-
ces. The acceptance may depend upon the formality of the instru-
ment-that is, on whether the writing is something more than an ex-
pression in a personal letter.41 Where accepted as a substitute for 
delivery of a chattel or a document representing intangible property, 
such as a certificate of stock or a bond, it obviously follows that 
the paper itself must be delivered. This is the situation that presents 
40. See 230 Ill. at 607-08, 82 N.E. at 954 (Cartwright & Carter, JJ., dissenting); 
cf. In re Wnuk's Will, 256 Wis. 360, 41 N.W.2d 294 (1950) (warranty deed admitted 
to probate where testamentary intent was evidenced by the deed itself). 
41. See BROWN, supra note 7, § 7.10. 
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problems most closely analogous to those identified above involving 
deeds. 
a. Gifts causa mortis. Gifts induced by the fear of death from 
an existing physical condition of the donor are held to be revoked 
by the donor's recovery from that condition and are otherwise revo-
cable upon a proper expression of the donor's intention.42 Con-
ceptually, although called causa mortis, the gift is inter vivos in the 
sense that the property is treated as passing at the time of delivery, 
though it is subject to revocation. In a few cases, courts have in-
sisted upon the distinction between a gift that will take effect at 
death and one that is revocable, and have held invalid a gift where 
the donor, in fear of death, delivers a chattel to the donee or to a 
third person with the statement that the gift is not to take effect or 
that the chattel is not to be given to the donee before the donor's 
death. 43 The distinction between a conveyance on a condition 
precedent (the donor's death) and one subject to a condition subse-
quent (revocation) is difficult enough to apply or to justify in formal 
property transactions. Gifts causa mortis are usually made infor-
mally and without benefit of counsel. Trapping a donor by such a 
refinement, so that his gift fails if he uses the wrong words, cannot 
be justified. Most courts do not even inquire into such a question, 
and of those that do most reject the distinction. Recognition is given 
to the fact that in substance such a gift is inherently imperfect until 
the donor's death. Commonly, courts simply declare that a gift causa 
mortis is one kind of "testamentary" transfer that, by long tradition, 
escapes the statutes of wills. 44 In fact, such a characterization is mis-
leading. Gifts causa mortis are not like the giving by a person of 
whatever personal property he may have at his death. It is really 
only the revocable feature that reduces the inter vivos quality of a 
gift causa mortis. So long as such gifts must be delivered, and espe-
cially where the delivery requirement is more strictly applied than 
it is with gifts inter vivos, they raise no greater conveyancing risks 
than gifts inter vivos. 
b. Gifts inter vivos. Sometimes such gifts are made, as in the 
case of deeds of land, by delivering a chattel to a third ·person to 
be delivered to the donee or held for him. Courts have tried to dis-
tinguish between a direction to hold for the donee, where title is said 
42. See id. §·§ 7.15-.20. 
43. See Slager v. Allen, 220 S.W.2d 752 (Mo. App. 1949); BROWN, supra note 
7, § 7.17. 
44. See In re Nols' Estate, 251 Wis. 90, 28 N.W.2d 360 (1947). 
866 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:845 
to pass immediately "in trust" for the donee, and a direction by which 
the third party is made the donor's agent for delivery.45 Even in 
the former case the gift will fail if the donor has reserved the right 
to recall the chattel. Although it has seldom been attempted, the 
analogy to a deed in escrow has been used to sustain a gift of cor~ 
porate stock where the third party was directed to deliver the stock 
certificates on the donor's death, upon proof that no right of recall 
was reserved.46 The donor was, in effect, held to have reserved a 
life interest. 
Suppose a donor delivers stock certificates to a donee with a 
written statement that "these are mine as long as I live and then 
yours." Such a gift has been held invalid.47 If these directions were 
oral, the result would be obvious, unless one were to apply the 
analogous rule of deeds of land, under which the gift would be 
treated as effective immediately free of the reservation. Does it 
make any difference that the reservation was in writing? Perhaps 
not, in view of the informality of the writing. The question remains: 
Can a donor deliver a deed or gift of personal property to the donee 
and reserve an interest for life expressly in the deed? If it can be 
done in a deed of land, it should be possible in a deed of personal 
property. But one should be prepared to find a court, unfamiliar 
with deeds of personal property, treating the writing merely as a con-
structive or symbolical delivery, which is vitiated by the old saw that 
a donor must part with all dominion and control over the chattel 
itself. 
Such a problem is involved where a partnership agreement 
provides that upon the death of any partner his interest in partner-
ship property shall be paid to the decedent's wife or to others. In 
several cases such a provision has been held void as testamentary. 48 
This simple and sensible arrangement seems so free of any of the 
dangers that the wills acts are designed to prevent that an effort 
should be made to find some reasonable rationale for sustaining it. 
A contractual analysis will not help, for there is no promise by a sur-
viving partner to pay a third-party beneficiary, since each partner is 
45. iSee Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of 
Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REV. 568, 586 
(1927). 
46. See Innes v. Potter, 130 Minn. 320, 153 N.W. 604 (1915). 
47. See Zimmerman v. Fawkes, 70 Idaho 389, 219 P.2d 951 (1950). 
48. See, e.g., In re Hillowitz's Will, 24 App. Div. 2d 891, 264 N.Y.S.2d 868 
(1965); cf. In re Dash's Will, 120 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Surr. Ct. 1953) (agreement ad-
mitted to probate where there was testamentary intent and compliance with the stat-
ute of wills). 
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attempting to dispose of his own property. The difficulty with 
calling the provision in question an inter vivos transfer is that each 
partner presumably can bring about a dissolution of the partnership 
in his lifetime and so get all his interest for himself. But this does 
not necessarily mean that he has conveyed nothing. It could be ar-
gued that a partner either has conveyed a future interest in his share 
of the partnership property or has conveyed his interest to the surviv-
ing partners in trust for his donee. The implicit power of a partner 
to defeat the conveyance by dissolution of the partnership could be 
treated simply as a reserved power to revoke. Surely the procedure 
for dissolution supplies more formalities than those normally pre-
scribed by an express power of revocation. The fact that partnership 
property may be disposed of implies that such disposition also must 
comply with partnership law or the agreement, and does not rest in 
the unfettered discretion of any partner.49 
Finally, a deed of land, delivered to the grantee, which also 
provided that the conveyance shall include all personal property 
owned by the grantor at his death, was held not to convey any per-
sonal property inter vivos. 50 The troublesome nature of this problem 
is discussed more fully below. 51 · 
4. Trusts 
Obviously, the rules respecting conveyances of land and gifts of 
personal property apply when such transactions are in trust, unless 
the trust is self-declared; the problems discussed above in relation to 
such transfers may also exist where the dispositions are in trust. 
Some of the contractual problems already examined also recur here, 
and several of them are considered below. They are followed by 
problems peculiar to trusts. 
a. Conveyancing and contract problems. In Alexander v. 
Zion's Savings Bank and Trust Co.,52 property was transferred in 
trust to pay the income to the settlor and his wife during his life, 
reserving to the settlor the power to revoke and to change benefi-
ciaries. The settlor's wife died, he remarried, and he amended the 
49. Cf. Crowell v. Himes, 117 Ind. App. 56, 69 N.E.2d 135 (1946) (provision 
in a sharecropping lease, through which the lessee would receive all personal prop-
erty on the premises should the lessor die during the term, denied effect because, 
due to the year-to-year basis of the lease, the lessor remained in complete control 
of the personal property). 
50. See Brennenstuhl v. Scharfenberger, 259 S.W.2d 41 (Ky. 1953). 
51. See text at note 57 infra. 
52. 2 Utah 2d 317, 273 P.2d 173 (1954). 
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trust to provide that his second wife would have the use and 
occupancy of trust land for life, with remainders for the benefit of 
the plaintiffs. The trust instrument also contained a typical spend-
thrift clause that provided that no interest should vest in the benefi-
ciaries until they became entitled to receive income or principal 
absolutely. After the second wife had enjoyed her interest for many 
years, and after the settlor's death, the plaintiffs sued to terminate 
the trust and to receive the corpus. The wife claimed her statutory 
intestate share of the trust estate, and the court held that she was 
entitled to it, on the ground that the trust was testamentary and void. 
Presumably, the plaintiffs were not entitled to the balance after pay-
ment of the widow's share. 
It may have been proper to hold that such a trust could not be 
used to defeat the wife's statutory share, although there might have 
been some question about her right to challenge it after having en-
joyed its benefits. But the trust should otherwise have been held 
valid. The fact that the beneficiaries' interests were not to "vest" 
in the settlor's lifetime does not mean that no interest passed to them. 
It seems improper to construe typical spendthrift language as having 
any purpose other than to make the beneficiaries' interests inalien-
able. Such language cannot properly be construed as preventing the 
transfer of any interest so long as it is certain, by the terms of the 
instrument, and apart from the power to revoke, that the benefici-
aries would have the right to it at a future time. In other words, 
if the settlor has given them a future interest, his statement that he 
has given them nothing must be disregarded unless he means that 
they are never to receive anything under any circumstances. 53 
In Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 54 the owner of a business contracted 
in writing to sell it, the buyer agreeing in part to pay $15,000 to 
the seller's son, who was informally told by his father to use the 
money to pay hospital and doctors' bills incurred by the father and 
to keep the balance for himself. After the father's death, part of 
the money was expended, upon the son's direction, to pay the ex-
penses of the father's last illness, and the balance was paid to the 
son. The court held that he was not entitled to keep it because there 
had been no gift inter vivos to the son, but rather an attempted testa-
mentary disposition. On the contrary, it could have been held that 
53. But cf. Loud v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 298 Mo. 148, 249 S.W. 629 
(1923) (spendthrift clause held to convey only a contingent interest; since a question 
of remoteness was involved, the instrument was in violation of the rule against per-
petuities and therefore void). 
54. 310 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1962). 
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the son was entitled to the money as a third-party beneficiary of the 
contract of sale, but in trust with the duty to enforce the contract, 
to use the proceeds collected for the benefit of the designated credi-
tors, and to hold the balance for himself. Trusts of personal prop-
erty can be oral where they arise out of a contract or upon proper 
delivery of personal property to a trustee, which I believe is unfor-
tunate. But even if it were otherwise and oral trusts were regarded 
as objectionable, that is hardly a reason to deprive a son of his rights 
under the contract. It has been held, moreover, that even when land 
is conveyed upon an oral trust, the grantee can perform the trust 
against objections by other interested parties. 
In Urbancich v. Jersin,55 a decedent in his lifetime opened a joint 
bank account, and the evidence showed that the defendant codeposi-
tor was directed to pay the funds after the decedent's death to the 
latter's nieces and nephews. The court held that the defendant took 
no interest in the account, since it was an attempted testamentary 
transfer. The same criticism discussed above of the courts' treatment 
of joint bank accounts applies here. The court said that the nephews 
and nieces were not parties to the account and could take nothing, 
and that it had not been intended for the defendant to take anything. 
This should mean merely that it was intended that he take in trust 
for them. As in Rodriguez, oral proof of such an intention, whether 
or not it should be enforced against the defendant, is not a good 
reason to deny him his rights as a depositor. Another obstacle to 
effectuating the donor's intention might have been mentioned. It 
is declared to be the law that a manifestation of an intention to create 
an inter vivos trust in the future does not create a trust, either 
presently or in the future. 56 Such a rule is sensible if its meaning 
is properly limited. It does not seem helpful or sensible to say that 
a person cannot be presently given a future interest, which, when 
it comes into possession, will be administered as a trust. Even if 
the rule applies to such a case, the transaction can be construed to 
create a present trust if one is willing to accept the fact that for the 
time being the trustee has no active duties. 
Clearly no trust can be created without a res. Nor can an inter 
vivos trust be created other than by a self-declared trust unless an 
interest in properly designated property is given to the trustee inter 
vivos. It has thus had been held that a trust instrument that purports 
to transfer in trust all property owned by the settlor at his death does 
55. 123 Colo. 88, 226 P.2d 316 (1950). 
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 26 (1959). 
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not create a trust inter vivos. 57 The reason is not merely that the 
expressed intention is to create a trust in the future, but also that 
no property is transferred in trust inter vivos. It might seem that 
such a result is necessary under any conceivable standard for draw-
ing the testamentary-inter vivos distinction. This is one of the few 
kinds of recurrent will substitutes, if not the only one, that is not 
saved by a proper application of the passing-of-an-interest test. 
Should it nevertheless be saved where, as in the instant case, a safe-
guard against the usual dangers involved in executing wills might be 
found in the formality of an instrument delivered to a trustee? In 
fact, I would not find it offensive if a court were to uphold such a 
transaction as a will to be administered as such. Such a result might 
conceivably be justified under a principle of "substantial compliance" 
with the usual formal requirements for the execution of wills. 68 I 
would not expect, however, that a court could be induced to fashion 
such a result without some sort of legislation that liberalizes the 
application of those requirements. Nor am I prepared to assert that 
any attempt to give inter vivos all the property that one owns at 
death should be sustained. 
In a similar case, a father expressed in writing to his children 
that he had received $25,000 from their mother, "and if I have it 
at the time of my death I want it paid" to them. In the absence 
of any other acts by the donor, it is difficult to escape the court's 
conclusion that his statement could have no inter vivos effect. 50 
b. Power to revoke and other reserved powers. It has long 
been held that the reservation of a power to revoke a trust does not 
rob the trust of its inter vivos effect. It is easy to understand why 
such a reservation is desired by settlors, and to justify the approval 
the courts have given it. When nothing else is reserved, the con-
cept of a defeasible property interest here has real substance. The 
trust is a going concern, and the beneficiaries have interests that are 
presently enjoyable. It is also obvious that if a settlor reserves only 
an interest to himself as beneficiary, a substantial change has 
occurred in his prior absolute ownership. When these two reserved 
interests are combined, however, and a settlor reserves both a life 
interest and a power to revoke or amend, it may seem that he has 
altered his dominion over the trust estate so slightly that the change 
57. Niccolls v. Niccolls, 168 Cal. 444, 143 P. 712 (1914); cf. Brennenstuhl v. 
Scharfenberger, 259 S.W.2d 41 (Ky. 1953) (same result for deed attempting to con-
vey all personal property grantor might have at his death). 
58. See Langbein, supra note 2. 
59. Dawson v. Dawson's Admx., 272 S.W.2d 666 (Ky. 1954). 
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is purely formal. He has bound himself only to the extent of remov-
ing himself one step from absolute ownership; that is; he must take 
the time and make the effort to exercise the power to revoke in the 
manner prescribed. It has been recognized, however, that the permis-
sibility of this combination of reserved interests was implicit in the 
recognition of the power to revoke; for everything else that a settlor 
may want to retain can be gained merely by an amendment that 
exercises the power. And so it has turned out: everything settlors 
have reserved in addition to a power to revoke has been justified by 
substantial authority. For example, a settlor's reservation of a power 
of appointment, in addition to a life interest and a power to revoke, 
has been sustained. 60 Serious conflict arose only when settlors, in 
addition to such interests, also reserved substantial power to control 
the trustee in the administration of the trust. Although this too has 
been approved, there is still substantial authority that draws a line 
at this point. 61 The argument is that this accumulation of reserved 
interests has in effect converted the trustee into a mere agent of the 
settler, whose powers end at the settler's death. 
Sufficient reasons appear in much of what has been said herein 
for not drawing such a line. On a technical basis, the trustee in such 
a case has been given legal title, which normally is not given to an 
agent, with attending legal relations that keep his title from being 
barren or his role wholly passive; the passing-of-an-interest test is 
thereby satisfied. Should that fact be ignored and emphasis placed 
instead upon the essential substance of the transaction? The argu-
ment herein made for the passing-of-an-interest test assumes that it 
is essentially formal in the sense that it is limited only by the variety 
of property interests that can be conveyed inter vivos and the formal 
distinctions among them. It is also properly limited by a search to 
discover whether the transaction in question is reasonably free of 
those dangers of fabrication that usually inhere in the making of or-
dinary wills. Here the formalities of the transaction and the inter-
position of a trustee between the donor and donees seem sufficient 
assurance of the integrity of the transaction. 
c. Life insurance trusts. Much the same can be said of trans-
actions of this sort. 62 If an insured designates as beneficiary of the 
insurance policy a person whose contractual rights are to be held in 
trust, it can be argued that this is no different from any life insurance 
60. See 1 Scorr, supra note 13, § 57.1. 
61. See id. § 57.2. 
62. See id. § 57.3. 
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contract. But of course it is different in the sense that the require-
ments of trust law must also be satisfied. For example, the trustee 
must be given a property interest. The contract gives him such an 
interest, which is a chose in action, a right to enforce the insurance 
contract. The duties of the trustee during the lifetime of the 
insured-settlor are minimal, but they are real. The retention of sub-
stantial control by the insured, such as the right to change the bene-
ficiary, and the cash-surrender or other values of the insurance, 
raises a problem that is not different from that already considered in 
the context of an ordinary trust in which the settlor reserves the power 
to revoke and other interests as well. 
d. Formal requirements for trusts of personal property. A 
large gap in the law of conveyancing relates to trusts of personal 
property. In most states, the Statute of Frauds reaches trusts of land, 
but trusts of personal property can be created without any formal 
requirements, which means that it can be done orally. 63 This is the 
case both with declarations of trust (that is, self-declared trusts), and 
also with transfers in trust, where the transfer itself must be formally 
effective but the trust can be proven orally. Is an oral trust any less 
dangerous than an oral will? It is to the extent that the oral trust 
does not present the peculiar· dangers of allowing proof after a per-
son dies that something he did in his lifetime constituted his will. 
The lesser requirements for inter vivos transfers have been defended 
on the ground that there is some safeguard against imposition in the 
fact that two people who deal with one another at arm's length are 
both available to speak about what they have done. But here we 
are speaking of a kind of transfer of property interests that requires 
no formalities whatever. There may be historical and practical 
reasons for such a condition, but I do not believe it can be justified. 
No one is arguing for repeal of the Statute of Frauds or the aboli-
tion ·of the need for the delivery of gifts; hence, in the absence of a 
special reason for the gap in the creation of trusts, the gap should be 
closed. In fact, that has already been accomplished in at least one 
state. 64 A writing signed by the settlor or trustee should be the 
minimum. It would not seem sufficient, however, to proceed merely 
as though the Statute of Frauds were applicable. It would be better 
to require in addition that the writing be delivered in the same sense 
as delivery is required for deeds of land. A beneficiary would be a 
proper person to whom such a writing could be delivered. It may be 
63. See id. §§ 32.5, 39, 52. 
64. See GA. CODE§ 108-105 (1975). 
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too late to expect courts to raise such a formality. Curative statutes 
are in order. 
In Farkas v. Williams,65 a settlor purchased on several occasions 
corporate stock in his name as trustee for one Williams. For each 
purchase he signed, and delivered to the corporation a written 
declaration by which he declared himself trustee of the stock, re-
served the beneficial interest to himself for life, reserved the power 
to sell or to redeem the stock and to retain the proceeds of trust, 
and declared that the stock should vest absolutely in Williams at the 
settlor's death, subject to the condition that he survive the settlor and 
also to the settlor's power to change the beneficiary or otherwise to 
revoke the trust. The court upheld the trust on the basis of the usual 
analysis concerning the effect of the reservation of extensive interests 
by a settlor, noting that the settlor was still bound to an extent greater 
than if he had merely made a will. Such an analysis seems to reach 
its uttermost limits when, as here, the settlor not only reserves the 
usual powers and interests but is the sole trustee as well. In further 
defense of its decision, the court noted the formality of the trans-
action, which consisted not only of the issuance of stock in the 
settlor's name as trustee but also of separate written declarations of 
trust for each purchase. It may also be emphasized that these 
declarations were delivered to the corporation whose stock was held 
in trust. 
Where an employee's pension or profit-sharing plan provides that 
interests are to be paid upon his death to such persons as he 'shall 
designate in a written instrument filed with the trustee-employer, the 
exercise of such a right by the employee has been upheld against 
a claim that it was testamentary.66 The result seems proper, for it 
is not essentially different from a right to change the beneficiary of 
an insurance contract. It has been expressly authorized by statute 
in some states. 
There is a peculiar dearth of authority respecting the formalities 
required for the transfer by a beneficiary of his interest in personal 
property held in trust. It has been said that no writing is required. 67 
If the transfer is gratuitous, is it a gift that must be delivered? What 
is there to deliver other than a writing? If in fact there are no formal 
65. 5 Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955). Cf. In re Estate of Brenner, 547 
P.2d 938 (Colo. 1976), where a self-declared trust of land reserving similar powers 
was created by an instrument that referred to property not then owned by the settlor, 
but which was later conveyed to the settlor as "Trustee for R. Forrest Brenner'' 
( settlor-trustee). 
66 . .See 1 Scorr, supra note 13, § 57.4. 
67. See 2 id. § 138. 
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requirements, this is another gap in the law of conveyancing that 
should be filled, presumably in the same way as suggested for 
declarations of trust. 
Conveyances in trust have an unusual double-barreled effect. 
They are generally effective to convey legal title to the trustee and 
equitable interests to the beneficiaries. The two transfers, however, 
need not occur at once or by the same instrument. A settler can 
convey to a trustee inter vivos and designate the beneficiaries by his 
will. In such a case, it appears that a trust is created immediately 
and can be enforced by the settler by way of resulting trust unless 
and until he designates the beneficiaries. When he does so by his 
will, the will can be said to transfer the equitable interests. Suppose 
he directs that the trustee shall hold for such persons as he may name 
thereafter and, in fact, he does name them orally or by an informal 
writing. Clearly if he does not mean to do it by will, he must do 
it inter vivos by a writing if the trust property is land. Suppose the 
subject matter is personal property or the trustee is named benefici-
ary of life insurance that is to be held in trust. It makes no substan-
tial difference whether the transaction is treated as a transfer of the 
settler's retained equitable interest or as the completion of the initial 
conveyance in trust. Several courts have differed over the formali-
ties that must be observed. In one case, a memorandum found at 
the settler's death was held to be sufficient, 08 while in another, such 
a device was deemed testamentary. 69 Apart from the question 
whether the settler intended his informal writing to operate as a will, 
is it permissible for him to make an inter vivos transfer without de-
livery of the writing or some substitute therefor? If no formalities 
are required, can he do it orally? Whatever view one has generally 
about informally created trusts of personal property, surely all the 
dangers of oral wills are present here. This need not necessarily 
mean that the transaction must in all cases be deemed testamentary, 
so that an attested instrument is required. Rather it should mean 
that, if the settler intends to complete the transfer inter vivos, the 
formalities suggested above for all trusts of personal property should 
at least be required here. 
Reference is made again to the section of the Uniform Probate 
{i8. See Jackman v. Equitable Life Assur. Socy., 145 F.2d 945 (3d Cir. 1944). 
69. See Payton v. Almy, 17 R.I. 605, 24 A. 101° (1892); cf. Van Cott v. Prentice, 
104 N.Y. 45, 10 N.E. 257 (1887) (trust valid in which beneficiaries were named 
in a writing in a sealed envelope delivered to the trustee at the time of transfer 
with directions that it should not be opened until the settlor's death). 
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Code70 which provides that, in any written instrument effective as 
a contract, gift, conveyance, or trust, certain provisions shall neither 
be deemed testamentary nor shall render the instrument testamen-
tary. For example, it is provided: "(3) that any property which 
is the subject of the instrument shall pass to a person designated by 
the decedent in either the instrument or a separate writing, including 
a will, executed at the same time as the instrument or subsequently." 
The rights of creditors are not to be affected. 
I hope that the language referring to a separate, subsequently 
"executed," instrument will not be construed to permit its execution 
without any formal requirements other than a writing. Otherwise 
a new method will have been created for conveying land without 
satisfying either the requirements for wills or for inter vivas convey-
ances. If the reservation of a testamentary power of appointment is 
an apt analogy, it has been held and is generally assumed that the 
power must be exercised by a duly executed will. If the authors of the 
Uniform Probate Code really intend to tie inter vivas and testamen-
tary transactions together into one inter vivas transfer, and, so long 
as creditors' rights are not affected, to permit its completion by any 
informal writing, I must dissent. An attempt to regard otherwise 
testamentary dispositions as inter vivos when they are tied to inter 
vivos transactions in this manner is one thing. Even that requires 
some policy concessions. But if in becoming inter vivos a subse-
quent disposition need not even meet the formal requirements for 
inter vivas conveyances, I think such a result can be approved only 
after a thorough reexamination of all formal dispositive require-
ments and the policy they are thought to serve. 
5. Conclusions from the Cases 
Any inclination a court may have toward condemning contracts 
as testamentary dispositions of property should be summarily sup-
pressed. The only issue that really exists when enforcement of a 
promise is sought is governed by the law of contract-that is, 
whether under that law the promise is valid and binding. There 
should be no reason to question any contract on the ground that it 
is a substitute for a will, for, if it is, there is no law against it. A 
statute of wills and its underlying policy have nothing to do with con-
tracts. Those who need more comfort than that derived from such 
70. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 6-201; cf. id. § 2-513 (a reference in a will to 
a separate writing identifying the subject matter of a bequest is valid if it is in the 
testator's handwriting or signed by him. The writing may be prepared after execu-
tion of the will, and may be altered after preparation.). 
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a dogmatic assertion should observe that none of the types of con-
tract cases considered above present the kind of dangers encoun-
tered with informal or oral wills. 
In dealing with inter vivos transfers of real or personal property, 
the question should be, as with a contract, whether the transaction 
in question satisfies the law governing such conveyancing. As one 
encounters the subtleties of the law of estates, and as the line be-
tween testamentary and inter vivos transactions seems to blur, the 
"passing-of-an-interest" standard has evolved to sustain as inter vivos 
any disposition that transfers any property interest, present or future, 
vested or contingent, however slight. I believe that in the cases con-
sidered above, such a standard, when properly applied, can be a 
reasonably simple and straightforward device for saving those trans-
actions that ought to be saved. The question was raised at the be-
ginning of this essay whether there are kinds of dispositions involving 
interests that pass the test, but that ought nevertheless to be held 
testamentary because compliance with inter vivos formalities would 
not be enough to avoid the dangers -that the statutes of wills were 
designed to preclude. It now seems that, with one serious exception, 
such dispositions have not been encountered. Suspected trans-
actions are seen either to be essentially no different from ordinary 
conveyances by deed, gift, or trust, or they are attended by the sort 
of circumstances that constitute a sufficient substitute for attestation. 
The exception is a class of transactions that involves or depends upon 
the anomalous and perilous gap in the law of conveyancing that per-
mits trusts of personal property to be created without any formalities. 
Courts should also realize that the passing-of-an-interest test alone 
may not be an invulnerable safeguard of the policy advanced by the 
statutes of wills. A case may yet come along that passes the test 
but does not provide any assurance that the transaction involved is 
really genuine. 
The most striking fact that emerges from a review of -the cases 
is that in almost all of those involving purported inter vivos transfers, 
a proper application of the passing-of-an-interest :test would save 
them as effective inter vivos. The same can be said for a proper 
application of contract law to challenged contractual provisions. 
There has been a strange reticence among both courts and 
commentators toward declaring the passing-of-an-interest test valid 
and useful. We have noted that a number of courts have acted as 
if their decisions were justified by that test. One may at times sense, 
however, either a reluctance to espouse it or the attitude that there 
is no single, reliable standard for drawing the distinction between 
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inter vivos and testamentary dispositions. It is one of my two main 
conclusions herein that the test can, without embarrassment, be 
openly acknowledged and given respectability. Reticence in ac-
knowledging the standard can be replaced by caution in applying and 
by qualifying it in the manner herein explained. 
Reticence or caution in recognizing the passing-of-an-interest 
test, however, does not justify the cases that have misunderstood it, 
have applied it improperly, or have resorted to other vague notions 
about what is testamentary. This is the second main conclusion that 
I -have reached from the cases considered. 
There has been a noticeable diminution in litigation over this 
matter in the past ten years, as compared with the ten years imme-
diately after World War II. Yet I fear that there remains a greater 
risk, not in a court's allowing something testamentary to slip through 
its fingers, but in lingering old ghosts and the unwarranted fear of 
will substitutes. 
B. Spouses' Rights 
The whole picture changes drastically when the problem pre-
sented involves the administration of the law respecting a spouse's 
right to renounce any interest given by the will of a deceased spouse 
and to take instead a portion of the latter's estate as an intestacy, 
which is generally limited to a one-third share of the estate. A fun-
damental defect in such a limited marital property regime is the ap-
plication of the right of election only to property that a deceased 
spouse leaves by will. An opportunity was left for property owners 
to vitiate such a right by inter vivos dispositions; and thus arose the 
problem of "fraud" upon a spouse's share. The full dimensions of 
this problem and the efforts by courts to close or to reduce the gap 
cannot be explored here. 71 Some courts have dealt with attacks 
upon inter vivos dispositions by a surviving spouse in terms of the 
decedent's intent-that is, whether he intended to defeat or circum-
vent his spouse's claims upon his property. The difficulties in apply-
ing such a test have in some places virtually transformed it into one 
that assesses the fairness of an inter vivos disposition in the light of 
a variety of attending circumstances. 
A different approach to the problem, in which attention is con-
centrated upon the nature or effect of the inter vivos transfer, is more 
relevant to the distinctions explored herein between inter vivos and 
testamentary transactions. It should now be obvious that a variety 
71. See W.D. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE Wmow's SHARE (1960). 
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of property devices are available whereby a grantor of property may, 
in a gratuitous transfer, retain many of the elements of ownership. 
Some of these are sufficient to leave a grantor's control or enjoyment 
of the property substantially undiminished. I have argued that such 
facts are irrelevant in deciding whether the conveyance is testamen-
tary for the purpose of protecting the policy of the statutes of wills. 
Obviously, however, such facts may assume controlling importance 
where the only issue is whether the transaction is vulnerable to chal-
lenge by the grantor's spouse, who asserts that the property conveyed 
should be reached as a part of the grantor's estate for the purpose 
of the right of election. If such a transaction is indeed a subversion 
of the policy of the statutes enacted for the protection of surviving 
spouses, it is easy enough to say so and to declare the transaction 
vulnerable to the spouse's claim. It may also seem proper to 
describe such a transaction as testamentary with respect to a spouse's 
right of election. It is, however, neither necessary nor defensible 
to say that the transaction is testamentary for all purposes. There 
is nothing new in the notion that labels or classifications are to be 
applied with reference to and to be limited by the purposes or poli-
cies to be served. There is also no doubt that the policy of the stat-
utes of wills and the policy of spouses' election statutes are altogether 
different. 
The idea behind the particular distinction just asserted also is not 
new. It appears most strikingly in the Internal Revenue Code, in 
the basic notion that a variety of transactions that are not testamen-
tary for other purposes are so regarded in determining what property 
is includable in a decedent's gross estate for estate tax purposes. 
Tax experts are fond of saying, and for good reason, that the poli-
cies that sustain inter vivos transactions for property or trust purposes 
must yield to the fundamental objectives of the tax laws. Thus, the 
two kinds of problems are carefully kept separate, and courts that 
pass on tax questions are rarely misled into assuming that a property 
classification for tax purposes has any necessary relevance for other 
purposes. 
In respect to spouses' rights, the most famous case is the New York 
decision in Newman v. Dore,72 in which a settlor, three days before his 
death, conveyed all his property in trust, most of the provisions of 
which are not shown, but reserved a life interest in the income, the 
power to revoke, and substantial control over the powers given to the 
trustees. The trial court sustained the widow's attack upon the "valid-
72. 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937). 
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ity" of the trust, and this decision was affirmed. The appeals court re-
jected the "intention" test and called the trust "illusory." The meaning 
of that term was not made clear, other than that it had something to 
do with the extent of the dominion reserved by the settlor. In fact, 
the court refused to say whether such a trust is valid for any purpose, 
and the reported proceedings do not indicate the exact nature or con-
sequence of the judgment below. 
The same court subsequently sustained an attack by a widow 
upon a Totten trust' created by her husband for the benefit of a third 
person, on the ground that it was illusory under Newman v. Dore.73 
But ten years later, the court sustained a Totten trust against such 
a challenge. 74 The prior case was distinguished on the ground that 
the Totten trust there was never intended to have any real effect. 
The court made the remarkable statement that "[t]here is nothing 
illusory about a Totten trust as such."75 Such a statement means 
that the later court thought illusory meant an absence of any real legal 
effect for any purpose. Equally remarkable is the court's statement 
that there is no power in the courts to divide such a trust and to 
hold part of it good and part illusory. 
Until changed by legislation, no further clarification of the New 
York law came from the courts. Much remained in doubt: not only 
the question of the extent of reserved control that would render a 
transfer in trust illusory but also the very meaning of "illusory." Did 
the term mean "unreal" or "testamentary"? Or do these terms have 
the same meaning? After rejecting the intention test, did the court 
bring it back in disguise? It is at least obvious that the major source 
of confusion was the inability or unwillingness of the court to see 
that an inter vivos transaction can be vulnerable to a spouse's claim 
without being invalid altogether. 
A statute in Ohio provides that a settlor may reserve a power 
to amend or revoke a trust, and that such a trust is valid as to all 
persons, except that any beneficial interest reserved. to the settlor 
may be reached by his creditors.76 It was held, however, that a trust 
of corporate securities in which the settlor reserved a life interest 
and the power to revoke was illusory and void as to his widow, but 
was otherwise valid. 77 The court said that the law places a widow 
in a higher position than a mere creditor in respect to personal prop-
73. Krause v. Krause, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E.2d 779- (1941). 
74. In re Halpern's Estate, 303 N.Y. 3·3, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951). 
75. 303 N.Y. at 38, 100 N.E.2d at 122. 
76. OHIO RE.v. CoDE ANN. § 1335.01 (Page Supp. 1976). 
77. Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (Sup. Ct. 1944). 
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erty in an unrevoked revocable trust. The same result was reached 
in a similar case three years later. 78 More recently, however, in 
Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co.,79 the court overruled both prior cases, 
and relied at least in part on the statute to deny a widow's claim. 
The state of the authorities generally must be described as 
chaotic. Understandably, where Newman v._Dore has been relied 
on, the situation is not improved. Spouses have won in cases in 
which transactions were found testamentary, 80 apparently in the 
sense that the transactions were not valid for any purpose. Other 
courts have defeated the claims of spouses on the ground that the 
transactions were not testamentary,81 presumably meaning that they 
were valid for all purposes. The retention of control has been held 
to render trusts illusory as to spouses, 82 but without any clear indica-
tion in the decision that the trusts were valid for other purposes. 
Often not made clear is the degree of reserved control that will ren-
der a transaction illusory, or the extent to which the intent of a 
settlor to defeat his wife's claim may play a part in the decision. Ap-
parently, only in jurisdictions accepting the intention test as the basic 
standard is it clear that a judgment in favor of a spouse does not 
otherwise affect the validity of the transaction. 88 One court has de-
fined the intention test as requiring an intent to defraud a widow 
of her rights, but it also said that proof of actual fraud is required, 
which is not established merely by proof of intent to defraud but 
rather by proof that a donor did not intend to divest himself of owner-
ship. 84 Such a line of reasoning causes concepts and distinctions to 
dissolve before one's eyes. In view of its origin, the word "illusory" 
properly should designate a transaction that is vulnerable only to the 
special claims of spouses and not otherwise "testamentary," but the 
word illusory, even more than the word testamentary, implies the basic 
unreality of the transaction. Sometimes a transaction is called merely 
78. Harris v. Harris, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E.2d 378 (-Sup. Ct. 1947). 
79. 172 Ohio St. 489, 179 N.E.2d 60 (Sup. Ct. 1961). 
80. E.g., In re Pengelley's Estate, 374 Pa. 358, 97 A.2d 844 ( 1953); Bickers 
v. Shenandoah Valley Natl. Bank, 197 Va. 145, 88 S.E.2d 889 (1953); cf. In re 
Montague's Estate, 403 Pa. 558, 170 A.2d 103 (1961) (fraudulent inter vivos trans-
fer). 
81. E.g., United Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Garrett, 64 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. Ark. 
1946); Hom v. First Sec. Bank, - Utah 2d -, 548 P.2d 1265 (1976); Kerwin 
v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E.2d 299 (1945). 
82. See Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1944); 
W.D • .MACDONALD, supra note 71, at 88 n.74. 
83. W.D. MACDONALD, supra note 71, at 132. 
84. In re Montague's-Estate, 403 Pa. 558, 560-61, 170 A.2d 103, 105 (1961). 
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"colorable,"85 without making clear whether this means that it is 
testamentary or illusory, or exactly why it is only colorable, or whether 
it is colorable for all purposes. An Illinois court has recently de-
scribed as. "quasi-testamentary" an otherwise valid inter vivas transfer 
by which a donor retains sufficient control of the property to justify 
a claim upon it by his surviving spouse. 86 
In Montgomery v. Michaels,87 the Illinois court took a refreshing 
approach to this problem. The court held that a Totten trust bank 
account was illusory as to the donor's creditors and surviving husband 
but otherwise was valid to create an interest in the tru~t beneficiaries. 
The opinion is the clearest statement I have seen that such a trust 
"violates the policy of the statute which gives a distributive share of 
the decedent's estate to the surviving spouse," as well as the rules 
protecting creditors, but does not violate any other policy.88 In 
relying on Newman v. Dore, the court implied, but did not declare, 
that the same result would be reached in cases other than those in-
volving Totten trusts in which a settlor reserves substantial control 
over the property given in trust. If the court does intend to extend 
the Montgomery rule to such trusts, it will have to define the extent 
of the reserved control that will result in such an extension, particu-
larly the question whether a power to revoke alone is enough. 
Such a clarification of the issues as the court provided in Mont-
gomery does not alone, of course, solve the problem concerning the 
legitimate expectations of surviving spouses. Legislation may recon-
stitute the whole regime of marital property rights, as is accom-
plished by community property regimes. Other legislation has been 
more modest and may merely seek to clarify or reduce the problem 
in the manner suggested by Montgomery. For example, a statute 
in Pennsylvania provides that a conveyance by which a person retains 
a power of appointment by will, a power of revocation, or a power 
of consumption shall at the election of a surviving spouse be treated 
as a testamentary disposition so far as the surviving spouse is con-
cemed. 89 
There may be a substantial difference between a disposition that 
deprives a spouse of substantially all of the donor's property and one 
85. See W.D. MACDONALD, supra note 71, at 132-37. 
86. Toman v. Svoboda, 39 Ill. App. 3d 394,403, 349 N.E.2d 668, 676 (1976). 
87. 54 Ill. 2d 532, 301 N.E.2d 465 (1973). 
88. According to the Restatement, the deposit can be included in the computation 
of the share to which the surviving spouse is entitled. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS § 58, comment e (1959). 
89. PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6111 (Purdon 1975). 
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by which the donor includes substantial benefits for his spouse. New 
York has enacted elaborate legislation that is discriminating in this 
respect and declares certain kinds of dispositions immune from at-
tack by a surviving spouse. 90 
The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) is similar in purpose to the 
New York statute but different in structure and detail.01 Its framers 
have borrowed the idea expressed in the Internal Revenue Code that 
certain types of transactions are to be treated as testamentary in the 
sense that the property involved remains in the donor's estate for 
estate tax purposes. The concept introduced is that of the "aug-
mented estate" of a decedent. For the purposes of a spouse's right 
of election, a decedent's estate is treated as augmented by certain 
inter vivos transfers not made for full consideration, including trans-
fers by which the decedent retained at his death the possession or 
enjoyment of, or the right to, income from the property, or the power 
to revoke, consume, invade, or dispose of the principal. These 
benefits to a spouse are balanced in effect by deducting from the 
augmented estate the value of property received by the spouse from 
the decedent during the marriage. When the balance is struck, and 
the augmented estate is determined, the surviving spouse may elect 
to take one-third of it. The spouse need not renounce the interest 
given by the decedent's will, but if the will gives less than the elec-
tive share, the spouse will receive the difference between that share 
and the amount received by the will. 
Under any of the statutes mentioned above, it seems clear that 
any disposition that is testamentary in the sense that it is invalid inter 
vivos for all purposes will become a part of the decedent's estate and 
be subject to a spouse's right of election. The same is true for prop-
erty not effectively conveyed inter vivos for any reason. Otherwise, 
under the New York statute and the UPC, a surviving spouse pre-
sumably has no basis for a claim against a decedent's estate except 
as provided in the statute. 
Some persons may argue that this sort of protection is not enough 
or is incomplete; others may argue that it goes too far, or is impracti-
cable or unmanageable. Those who hold either opinion may find 
more solace in an entirely different sort of statutory scheme-one 
that may appear to be the simplest and most equitable of all. I refer 
to the so-called family maintenance legislation, which has been 
adopted in England, New Zealand, and in several Canadian and 
90. N.Y. EsT., POWERS & Thus-rs !..Aw·§ 501.1 (McKinney 1967), 
91. UNIFORM PROBATE CoDE §§ 2-201 to -207. 
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Australian jurisdictions. 92 Under such legislation, a surviving spouse 
or certain other designated dependents may challenge a decedent's 
will on the ground that the decedent did not make "reasonable pro-
vision" for the claimant. In practice, these matters are handled by 
referring them to a master who hears all relevant evidence, and then 
often are resolved through an agreement between the parties in in-
terest that is submitted for court approval. My own limited examina-
tion of the workings of this scheme some years ago showed no flood -
of claimants or congested dockets in its administration. 
The main burden of the inquiry herein, however, does not pro-
ceed so far. In the absence of substantial legislative changes, courts 
are left to straighten out the mess they are in. Their first indispen-
sable step must be to separate the policy of the statutes of wills, from 
the policy of the spouses' election laws, and to recognize that the 
term "testamentary" can have more than one meaning, one of which 
can be limited to dispositions that offend the policy of the spouses' 
election laws. Having done so, courts will be left to identify the ele-
ments of a transaction that make it testamentary in the limited sense 
-that is, whether the reservation of only a life interest or a power 
to revoke is enough. It should also be recognized that courts re-
remain free to use the test of the intention of a donor to defraud 
his spouse, or a test that balances all relevant equities, without strug-
gling over what makes a transaction testamentary as to a surviving 
spouse. 
C. Creditors' Rights 
Gratuitous transfers of property are subject to attack by creditors 
of the donor under the usual rules relating to fraudulent conveyan-
ces. Of greater value to creditors, however, is the usual regime of 
decedents' estate administration, one of the main purposes of which 
is the marshalling of assets to give creditors of a decedent priority 
over the interests of legatees or heirs. Under such a system, our 
old problem arises again: What inter vivos dispositions by a decedent 
are subject to challenge on the ground that they are essentially testa-
mentary, so that the property transferred remains the property of the 
donor and therefore a part of his estate? It is obvious that, whenever 
an inter vivos disposition fails as testamentary for all purposes, the 
property is available to creditors of the donor's estate. This fact, 
however, does not entirely resolve the problem respecting the legiti-
mate expectations of creditors of a donor. We have seen that under 
92. See Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1!>38, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 45; W.D. 
MACDONALD, supra note 71, ch. 21. 
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the passing-of-an-interest test, many kinds of transactions have 
escaped or should escape the testamentary challenge, for reasons that 
relate to the proper limits of the policy of the statutes of wills. At 
this point, it becomes evident that a problem arises analogous to that 
in the cases involving the rights of the spouses of decedent donors. 
Should a person be allowed to escape the claims of his creditors by 
an inter vivos transaction that leaves him in a position where he does, 
or can, enjoy the property despite his conveyance? If he has re-
served a beneficial interest, such as a life estate or a life interest in 
trust, such interest of course can be reached by his creditors. If he has 
gratuitously exercised a general power of appointment that he has 
reserved in a conveyance, the rules relating to fraudulent conveyances 
apply to his exercise of the power. 03 If he transfers property in 
trust, reserving a life interest and a general power to appoint the 
remainder and creates no other beneficial interests that he cannot 
destroy by exercising the power, the property is subject to the claims of 
his creditors, even though the power is not exercised, provided other 
property of the donor is insufficient for that purpose. 04 
One may wonder why the same rule does not apply where a 
donor of property inter vivos reserves a power to amend or revoke. 
In fact, apart from statutes, the only kind of transaction that has been 
held vulnerable to creditors is the Totten trust bank account. 00 As 
in Montgomery v. Michaels,06 the result in the Totten trust cases does 
not indicate that such a trust is invalid for all purposes. It also does 
not mean that creditors are limited to treating such a trust as a 
fraudulent conveyance. 
Under the Bankruptcy Act, 07 a trustee in bankruptcy presumably 
can reach the bankrupt's power to revoke a trust created by him. 
Statutes in at least ten states provide that if a grantor in a conveyance 
reserves to himself an absolute power of revocation, he is thereafter 
deemed the absolute owner of the estate conveyed so far as the rights 
of his creditors are concerned. 08 A similar statute in Ohio respect-
ing transfers in trust00 has been construed to limit the rights of credi-
tors to the lifetime of the settlor.100 
If courts can without legislation limit the validity of Totten trusts 
93. REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY§ 330 (1940). 
94. Id. -§ 328. 
95. See 1 Scorr, supra note 13, § 58.5; 4 id. § 330.12. 
96. 54 Ill. 2d 532, 301 N.E.2d 465 (1973), discussed in text at note 87 supra. 
97. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 11 U.S.C. § ll0(a) (1970). 
98. See statutes cited in 4 Scorr, supra note 13, § 330.12 nn.7 & 8. 
99. Omo R.Ev. CooE ANN. § 1335.01 (Page Supp. 1976). 
100. Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co., 135 Ohio St. 328, 21 N.E.2d 119 (1939). 
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so as to make them vulnerable to the claims of the donor's creditors, 
the same result should be reached in other kinds of revocable trans-
fers. I am not prepared to argue whether the policy of the law that 
protects creditors' rights has the same force as the policy protecting 
spouses' rights. It may be argued that modern creditors do not really 
need the kind of protection suggested here. If there is such a policy, 
courts can assert it without distorting the law respecting the testa-
mentary effect of transfers that purport to be inter vivos. Again, 
a conveyance can be testamentary with respect to creditors without 
being testamentary for all purposes. 
For estate planning purposes, it is as important to consider the 
possible relation between inter. vivos and testamentary transactions as 
it is to distinguish between them. It would be convenient for many 
worthy purposes if we could simply ignore the distinction. Surely 
a property owner who is thinking about providing for the future can-
not confine his though~s to what will happen at his death. We may 
even be moving toward a system in which ·the benefits of correlating 
all dispositive devices are thought to outweigh the importance of the 
formal distinctions, so that the latter conceivably might finally dis-
appear. Whether such a development would require adaptation to 
protect creditors, or whether some new system for defining creditors' 
rights could be worked out, is only one of the many imponderables 
involved, all of which are far too complex to be considered here. 
The most striking development in the relation between testamen-
tary and inter vivos transactions affects so-called pour-over wills. 
The efforts of courts to avoid the obstacles to pouring property by 
will into an inter vivas trust have generally been superseded by ex-
plicit statutory authority for overriding the obstacles.101 
Another more limited device has been referred to as a "reverse 
pour-over" device. Attempts have been made, by language in a life 
insurance trust, to make the proceeds payable to the trustee named 
in one's will, in trust according to the terms of one's will, or to a 
named trustee according to the terms of ·one's will. The reference is 
assumed to be to the settlor's last will, and not to an existing will, if 
there is one. When a settlor properly supplies the missing elements by 
will, there is no problem about the validity of the trust. The question 
at that point is whether the insurance proceeds are- to be administered 
as part of the settlor's estate ·or whether they are to be regarded as part 
101. See, e.g., UNIFORM 'I'EsTAMENTARY ADomoNS TO Thusrs ACT § l; UNI-
FORM PROBATE CooE § 2-511. The uniform acts are identical. These provisions 
or similar legislation now exist in over forty states. 1 Scorr, supra note 1-3, § 54.3 
nn. 39 &40. 
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of an inter vivos trust estate. It is obvious that only by means of some 
fictional notion of relation back can the trust be found to have been 
created inter vivos. But there are obvious reasons why a settlor de-
sires such a result. In a case involving a possible abatement of a 
legacy given by the settlor's will, it was held that the trust of the 
insurance proceeds was inter vivos.102 There may not be any com-
pelling policy obstacle to such a result. A Pennsylvania court, how-
ever, held that such proceeds were subject to the state's inheritance 
tax. 103 The same court held that the proceeds were available to 
creditors of the settlor's estate.104 
Anyone who believes that an inter vivos transaction can be 
deemed testamentary as to creditors of the donor on the basis of con-
trol reserved by him will find this kind of transaction testamentary 
in the same sense. One may have reason to so hold even where 
creditors have no access to property transferred in a manner not 
otherwise regarded as testamentary for all purposes. To the extent 
that it is applied, section 6-201 105 of the UPC expressly preserves 
the rights of creditors. 
Variants of this scheme are conceivable. The situation should 
be no different if land or personal property is transferred in trust 
to be held according to the terms of the settlor's will. Questions 
other than creditors' rights may, of course, become involved, which 
is the problem discussed above in connection with section 6-201 of 
the UPC. 
102. Tootle-Lacy Natl. Bank v. Rollier, 341 Mo. 1029, 111 S.W.2d 12 (1937). 
103. In re Myer's Estate, 309 Pa. 581, 164 A. 611 (1933). 
104. In re Kenin's Trust Estate, 343 Pa. 549, 23 A.2d 837 (1942). 
105. See text at note 70 supra. 
